Editing A Comment on Malwarebytes v. Enigma
From Bibliotheca Anonoma
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No doubt, paragraph (2) was intended to be the more important of the two short paragraphs of the section. It seems to fit more with the heading of the subsection. Yet in the long run, paragraph (1) became more momentous. Here's why: if you're not treated as the publisher or speaker of content someone else created, you can't be liable to be sued for defamation on it. | No doubt, paragraph (2) was intended to be the more important of the two short paragraphs of the section. It seems to fit more with the heading of the subsection. Yet in the long run, paragraph (1) became more momentous. Here's why: if you're not treated as the publisher or speaker of content someone else created, you can't be liable to be sued for defamation on it. | ||
The ACLU soon took the Attorney-General, Janet Reno, to court over this Act. In ''Reno v. ACLU (1997)'', the Supreme Court struck the punitive provisions of the CDA down, but kept this section, which was not challenged. Subsections (d) and (e) simply set out ancillary provisions. "Information content provider", as defined by this section, includes users of the Internet as well as websites; "interactive computer service" includes websites as well as ISPs. | |||
Since then, section 230 has become one of the most important enactments regulating the Internet. It allows sites to exist which cannot reasonably moderate all the content posted on it, because they are not liable for content that is posted which they don't know about. Even if they remove content, they're not treated as the publisher or speaker of the content that they choose to stay up as long as they do so in good faith, because of this section. | Since then, section 230 has become one of the most important enactments regulating the Internet. It allows sites to exist which cannot reasonably moderate all the content posted on it, because they are not liable for content that is posted which they don't know about. Even if they remove content, they're not treated as the publisher or speaker of the content that they choose to stay up as long as they do so in good faith, because of this section. | ||
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Part I consists of four divisions. Each division contains a criticism of how lower courts have interpreted section 230. | Part I consists of four divisions. Each division contains a criticism of how lower courts have interpreted section 230. | ||
# Division A states that at common law, "distributors" are responsible for the content they distribute if they know it is illegal. Thomas' opinion is that Congress did not intend to eliminate distributor liability when it enacted section 230. To prove that, he cites section 502, which imposed distributor liability, without mentioning that this section was struck down by ''Reno v. ACLU'' | # Division A states that at common law, "distributors" are responsible for the content they distribute if they know it is illegal. Thomas' opinion is that Congress did not intend to eliminate distributor liability when it enacted section 230. To prove that, he cites section 502, which imposed distributor liability, without mentioning that this section was struck down by ''Reno v. ACLU''. | ||
# Division B states that courts have ignored the word "another" in section 230 by "giving Internet companies immunity for their own content." Thomas especially criticizes how websites that alter submitted content are still not liable for the content so altered according to the jurisprudence of some federal courts. | # Division B states that courts have ignored the word "another" in section 230 by "giving Internet companies immunity for their own content." Thomas especially criticizes how websites that alter submitted content are still not liable for the content so altered according to the jurisprudence of some federal courts. | ||
# Division C states that some courts have concluded that section 230(c)(1) protects corporations' decisions to remove content as well as host it. Thomas views that line of thought as conflicting with the more specific liability shield in (2)(a). | # Division C states that some courts have concluded that section 230(c)(1) protects corporations' decisions to remove content as well as host it. Thomas views that line of thought as conflicting with the more specific liability shield in (2)(a). | ||
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Part II, as is customary for Supreme Court opinions, suggests possible alternative courses of action to the disapproved measure: for instance, it recommends the States and the Federal Government "update their liability laws to make them more appropriate for an Internet-driven society." | Part II, as is customary for Supreme Court opinions, suggests possible alternative courses of action to the disapproved measure: for instance, it recommends the States and the Federal Government "update their liability laws to make them more appropriate for an Internet-driven society." | ||
==Notes== | ==Notes== | ||
<references /> | <references /> | ||